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THE NEPAL CONSTITUTION OF 1990: 
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Ter Ellingson 
University of Washington 
The Nepal constitution of 23 Kartik, 2047 Y.S. (November 9, 1990 A.D.) is a bold attempt to 
institutionalize the goals of the popular movement of the Spring of 1990. In a dramatic reversal of previous 
formulations , it places sovereignty in the people and makes the king the symbol of the nation, thus legally 
transforming the state from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. It reinstates the system of multiparty 
democracy absent since the brief democratic experiment of the 19 50s, and presents guarantees of new basic 
rights. The subsequent completion of elections and formation of a new Government according to its provisions, 
even with the problems and conflicts common to such fundamental political restructurings, have provided 
decisive steps towards transforming it from a theoretical document to a living reality. 
The 1990 constitution will affect first of all the lives of the people of Nepal , but also will have its effects 
on the work of scholars who do rese;\rch in Nepal , whether or not their fields of study center on contemporary 
politics . As an institutional, and in some sense revolutionary, manifestation of the worldwide pro-democracy 
movements ofthe early 1990s, the Nepal constitution should also be of interest to scholars of other areas and 
general theorists interested in political change and democratic movements. Its full significance and effects 
will not be known for some time to come: but even at an early stage of its implementation and interpretation, 
it raises issues that deserve preliminary consideration. 
Structure and Models 
The new Nepal constitution is a complex document which includes a preamble, 133 articles grouped into 
23 parts, and 3 appended schedules: 
Preamble 
Part 1: Preliminary 
Part 2: Citizenship 
Part 3: Fundamental Rights 
Part 4: Directive Principles and Policies of the State 
Pm1 5: His Majesty 
Part 6: Raj Parishad 
Part 7: Executive 
Part 8: Legislature 
Part 9: Legislative Procedure 
Part 10: Financial Procedure 
Part 11: Judiciary 
Part 12: Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of 
Authority 
Part 13: Auditor-General 
Part 14: Public Service Commission 
Part 15: Election Commission 
Part 16: Attorney-General 
Pm1 17: Political Organisations 
Part 18: Emergency Power 
Part 19: Amendment of the Constitution 
Pm1 20: Miscellaneous 
Part 21: Transitional Provisions 
Part 22: Definitions and Interpretation 
Part 23: Short Title and Commencement 
Schedule 1: National Flag 
Schedule 2: National Anthem 
Schedule 3: Coat-Of-Arms 
The first four parts deal with primary issues and definitions of the state. sovereignty, citizenship, rights 
and policies. Parts 5 and 6 arc concerned with the King and the council on royal affairs,known as the Raj 
Paris had. Parts 8-11 cover the 3 main .branches of government: executive, legislative and judiciary; and parts 
12-16 have to do with major invcstigati 've and administrative commissions and offices. The remaining 
sections, parts 17-23 , relate to various issues and institutions not covered in the other parts, ranging from one-
time issues concerning the transition between old and new constitutions, to technical definitions; of special 
note here are the provisions regarding political parties (Part 17) , a crucial issue in the 1990 demonstrations 
that gave rise to the new constitution. and the emergency powers provisions ofPm118, providing for temporary 
suspensions of political rights in times of crisis. 
NEPAL CONSTITUTION: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
While the organ iza tion of the constitution generall y seems straightforward, the seven-arti cle Part I, 
labeled "Preliminary" , at firs t glance migh t seem a rando m co llec tion of subjects ra nging from the vital and 
profound to the near-trivial: 
Part 1: Prelimi nary 
1. Constitu tion as the Fundamental La\\' 
2. The Nation [=people irrespective of reli gion. race. caste or tribe[ 
3. The Sovereignty [vested in the Nepalese people[ 
4. The Kingdom [multiethnic, multilinguaL democratic. independent , indivisible and 
sovereign Hindu Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom: territory of Nepal] 
5. National Flag 
6. Language of the Nation [Nepali =" language of the nation" and o!Ticial language: 
all languages spoken as mother tongue in Nepal are "national languages"] 
7. National Anthem etc. [national nower. nati onal col or. nati onal animaL nati onal 
bi rd, coat of arms, including it s enlargement or reduction and color[ . 
Some of the subjects covered here are so ,·itally important that bl ood has been shed and li ves sacri ficed 
on their behalf, both during the 1990 democracy upri sing and in ear li er ti nlCs. And yet, none of these subjects 
are trivial: after all , blood has been shed and gove rnments challenged on behalf of the national animal , the 
cow, as well. I While Americans may have adopted the bald eagle as their nati onal symbol aft er the completion 
of their firs t constitution and wa ited nearly t\\ ·o ce nturies to give it pro tec ti on from killing, 2 the many centuri es 
of symbolic importance and protecti on of the cow before the adoption of any written consti tution in Nepal shows 
both the precedence and the significance of factors that some societi es mi ght regard as "only" symbolic. 
Indeed, the range of di scourse in these preliminary sec tions is of the nature not only of a voicing of universa l 
democratic principles, but also of a dialog on the symbols which give shape, significa nce and legitimacy to 
nearly every important fea ture, incl uding politica l institutions and processes. in a Hindu -Buddhi st society (cf. 
Errington 1989). Their placement in a leading section of the co nstitution , rather than being tacked on at the 
end, speaks to the ongoing vi tality of such symbols in a culturally unique contex t, as well as to a certain 
continuity with the cultural past3 
Wi th its 133 atticles, the Nepal constitution is considerably longer and more complex than the U. S. 
constitution (1789/1979), with its 7 arti cles and 26 amendments. and much shorter and simpler in struchrre 
than the Indian constitution (1 950/1 983 ) with its 395 arti cles. IU schedules , and J appendices. It closely 
approximates the constitution of the People's Republic ofChina ( 1982/ 1987) in number of articles (the Chinese 
constitution has 138); but, owing to grea ter length and complexity of the arti cles, the Nepal constitution is 
perhaps two to three times longer than the Chinese. In ove rall compari so n. the Nepal constitution fall s fairly 
high on the scale of length and complexity, but below some others such as the Sri Lanka constitution ( 1978), 
to say nothing of the Indian constitution , whi ch forms a widely- recognized class in itself. 
Following a general rule to which the 1990 Nepal co nstitution is no exception, length and complex ity 
increase with the amount of detail of administrative law and procedures superimposed on the more widespread 
and basic prescriptions of principles and gove rning structures shared by all constitutions. Thus, for example, 
not only do over half of the 24 articles of the section of the Nepal constitution which deal with the legislature 
(Part8, Articles44-67) concern mailers of procedure, but also the entire sec lion is followed by two more sections 
with an additional16 articles (Parts 9-10, Atticles 68-83 ) devoted entirely to procedural matters. While shorter 
constitutions leave administrative and procedural detail s to be worked out by mea ns such as enacted laws, legal 
challenges and test cases, custom and consensus. longer constitutions with explicit prescriptions of such deta ils 
embed them in the basic law of the land. It ca n be expected that in such cases, procedures are more diffi cult 
to adjust and adapt to changingcircumstances. as a constitutional amendment would theoreti cally be required 
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in every case. On the other hand, constitutional encoding of such details can provide safeguards against easy 
abuses and arbitrary changes in procedure at the administrative level. Whether this additional protection is 
worth the trade-off in procedural rigidity and resistance to change remains to be seen. 
In its length, complexity and detail of attention to administrative and procedural matters, the Nepal 
constitution seems to bear a family resemblance to the constitutions of neighboring South Asian countries 
influenced by the long and complex Indian constitution. For example, both the content and phrasing of the 
list of "fundamental rights" given in Part 3, together with the limitations placed on those rights, show 
considerable resemblances to the corresponding Part 3 of the Indian constitution. Some of the formulations 
regarding caste, including provisions for protection and affirmative action on behalf of castes victimized by 
past discrimination, also suggest borrowing from an Indian model. Other indications of Indian influence 
include, for example, the list of"directive principles and policies oft he state" (Part 4, Articles 24-26; cf. India 
1950/1983 Part4, Articles 36-51), which, as in the nearly identical>vords oftheindian constitution, in principle 
"shall be fundamental to the activities and governance of the State", but which in practice "shall not be 
enforceable in any court." 
Such resemblances notwithstanding, influences of the Indian and other neighboring constitutions are less 
important in the overall balance than might be expected. The Nepal constitution describes a different type of 
state: a constitutional monarchy rather than an elected-head-of-state republic, a "Hindu kingdom" rather than 
a secular state, and a society in which ethnic contrasts and interactions play at least as important a role as those 
of caste, to the extent that the two can be separated in Nepal's complexly distinctive social mosaic. While the 
original impetus behind the creation ofJndia 's constitution was to replace foreign colonial domination with 
an internally-based democratic alternative, the impetus toward creating the Nepal constihttion was to replace 
one kind of internal regime with another, more democratic kind. Four decades ' experience with self-
government in the post-colonial world provided a much wider range of examples th<1n h<id been available to 
the framers of the Indian constitution; and Nepal's constitution ref1ects the wider range of experiences and 
models available to its framers. Thus. for example. in direct response to the results of political experiments 
in the developing world, the Nepal constitution explicitly prohibits not only laws establishing a one-party state, 
but even participation in elections by parties advocating them (Article 112/2-3). On the other hand, apparently 
in response to controversies of constitutional interpretation in the industrialized world, it explicitly guarantees 
the right of privacy. And the guarantee of a right to infornwtion (At1icle 16) reflects a sophisticated awareness 
of the political implications of contemporary world trends that seems far less likely to have been included even 
a decade or two earlier. 
If the Nepal constitution is not a clone of the Indian, neither is it of the Chinese nor of any other single 
or dominant prototype. A Communist member of the framing commission suggests th<1t the postwar Japanese 
constitution was the most itilluential foreign model because of its example of a workable system of 
constitutional monarchy (private communication) ; but the Nepal constitution is as fundamentally different 
from Japan's constitution as it is from those of India, China, the U.S., or any other single country. Nor is there 
a single ideological model : it expresses. for example, a high degree of concern with social and economic rights 
and welfare of ordinary people and disadvantaged groups, while still maintaining a right to property. 
Reflecting a broad awareness of political, economic and ideological diversity and change in the world at large, 
the 1990 Nepal constitution is as complexly related to its counterparts in other nations as it is to its most direct 
model, the previous Nepal constitution, with which it shares fundamental similarities and differences. 
Popular Sovereignty, Constitutionalism and Constitutional Monarchy 
The new constitution explicitly identifies.sovereignty as ''vested" and " inherent" in the Nepalese people. 
The basic formulation on the subject is contained in Part 1, Article 3: 
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The Sovereignty: The sovereignly of Nepal is vested in the Nepalese people and shall be 
exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Const itution. (Article 3) 
This seemingly simple statement has complex and powerful implications. Some of these can be seen in 
a comparison of the preambles oft he 1962 and 1990 consl ituiions, where sovereign powers formerly "inherent 
in" the King, "devolved on Us" by inheritance "from Our August and Revered Forefathers" are now defined 
as inherent in the people, with authorities to be "exercised by" the King "in accordance with the provisions 
of this Constitution." The transfer of sovereignty to the people, then. is the cornerstone on which the new 
structure of a constitutional monarchy is to be erected. 
PREAMBLE [1962 Conslilulion]: 
Whereas it is desirable in the best 
interest and for all-round progress of 
the kingdom of Nepal and of the 
Nepalese people to conduct the gov-
ernment of the country in conso-
nance with the popular wi II ; ... 
And whereas the happiness and pros-
perity of Our beloved subjects have 
always been Our only objective for 
the accomplishment of which we are 
solemnly resolved; ... 
Now, THEREFORE, I, King Mahendra 
Bir Bikram Shah Deva, in exercise of 
the sovereign powers and preroga-
tives inherent in Us according to the 
constitutional law, custom and usage 
of Our country and which devoh 1ed 
on Usfro/11 Olii·August and Revered 
Forefathers, do hereby enact ;wd pro-
mulgate this Constitution. 
PREAMBLE [1990 Constitution]: 
Whereas We are convinced that in 
the independent and sovere ign 
Nepa l, the source of authority is 
inherent in the people. and, there-
fore, we have from time to time, 
made known our desire to conduct 
the government of the country in 
co nsonance with the popular will ; ... 
Now, therefore, keeping in view the 
desire of the people that the state 
authoritvand S0\1ereign poll'ers shall, 
ajfer the col/tlltencement of this Con-
stittttion, be exercised in accordance 
with the provisions of this Constitu -
tion , 1, KING BIRENDRA BJR 
BIKRAM SHAHDEVA, by virtue of 
t!te State authority as exercised by 
Us, do hereby Enact and Promulgate 
this CONSTITUTION OF THE 
KINGDOM OF NEPAL by and with 
the advice and consent ofthe Co uncil 
ofMinisters. 
Popular sovereignty, a controversial issue in the adoption of! he constitution, thus would seem to guarantee 
a democratic basis of government. Yet, U.S. readers, at least. may experience a moment of cognitive dissonance 
when projectingtheirexperienceofa conslilulion based on popular sovereignly that begins "We, the people ... " 
with the Nepal constitution which begins and is promulgated via the Royal rather than the popular "we". The 
British constitutional concept oflegislative sovereignly is not explicitly cited in the constitution, all hough some 
provisions may seem to presuppose it - and, in general. language comparable lo the U.S. constitution's 
"Congress shall make no law regarding ... " is not used. Rather, such sovereignly-restricting language is 
characteristically applied to unnamed protagonists, whether groups or individuals, in a wide range of 
provisions to the effect that "Questions regarding [x action by His Majesl)' and/or the government] shall not 
be raised in any court" -a seemingly fundamenta l and potentially crippling limitation lo popular sovereignly, 
although its real significance will only be w01:ked out in practice. 
The meaning of popular sovereign!)' in the transition from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy, of 
course, hinges on the establishment of democratic institutions and powers, and the nature and extent to which 
the formerly sovereign powers of the monarch have been limited, transferred to other organs of government, 
and/or subjected to constitutional checks and balances. Such a process ofintentional constitutional delineation 
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of controls and limits on the arbitrary or one-sided exercise of power, or constitutionalism, is an impetus behind 
the creation of many constitutions; in Nepal in 1990, its pe~rticular focus was on the constitutionalization of 
a formerly absolute monarchy. Thus, in the new constitution, the former royal "sovereign powers and 
prerogatives inherent in Us" have formally devolved to "the State authority as exercised by Us," subject to 
"the desire of the people that the state authority and sovereign powers shall .. . be exercised in accordance with 
the provisions of this Constitution;" e~nd the King's status, Cit least in theory, has become a symbolic one: 
(2) His Majesty is the symbol oft he Nepalese nationality and the unity oftheNepalese people. 
(3) His Majesty is to preserve and protect this Constitution by keeping in view the best 
interests and welfare of the people of Nepal. (At1icle 27) 
Yet His Majesty's role under the 1990 constitution is hardly restricted to symbolism. He is given explicit 
status as a part of two of the three branches of government, executive and legislative; and his powers extend 
to the judiciary branch in more than symbolic ways. 
Articles 35 and 44 give the king formal status as Cl part of both the executive and legislative branches: 
The executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal shall, pursuant to this Constihttion and other 
laws, be vested in His Majesty and the Council of Ministers. (Article 3511) 
There shall be a Legislature, to be ce~lled Parliament, which shall consist of His Majesty and 
two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the National Assembly. (Article 44) 
Although the language of these formule~tions seems to imply equal status and balance of powers between 
the king and elected officials, subsequent clauses make it clear that real checks e~nd limitations have been placed 
on royal powers: 
Except as otherwise expressly provided as to be exercised exclusively by His Majesty or at 
His discretion or on the recommendation of any institution or officiaL the powers of His 
Majesty under this Constitution shall be exercised upon the recommendation and advice and 
with the consent of the Council of Ministers. Such recommendation, advice and consent 
shall be submitted through the Prime Minister. (At1icle 35/2) 
Thus, the king's "exercised" executive powers are subordinated to the "inherent" authority of popular 
sovereignty, regulated and limited by the recommendation, advice and consent of elected representatives. 
Although the king appoints the Council of Ministers, he does so upon the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister, who must be the leader of the majority party in the House of Representatives, and who is directly 
responsible to it (Article 36). In general , the king's executive powers are carefully circumscribed in Part 7, 
and the primacy of elective representative government clearly spelled out in clauses covering a broad range 
of contingencies. It is possible to envision problems if some king, in the f11ture, should be inclined to 
undemocratically exploit potential loopholes such as the ability to temporarily appoint unelected persons as 
Deputy Prime Minister or other ministers. their eligibility for appointment CIS Prime Minister at the death or 
resignation of a current Prime Minister. the dissolution of Parliament pending elections, or other circum-
stances. Such a case, however unlikely it might be. would in any event require special circumstances and 
complex manipulations oflegal subtleties that would seem less tempting than more direct forms of action. But, 
barring the catastrophic, and assuming a normally functioning state and society, the implementation of popular 
sovereignty and representative government and the constitutionalize~tion of monarchial powers seem as 
straightforwardly and firmly established as under any parliamentary system. 
The king's legisle~tive role is more co111plex. First of all , although the House of Representatives is elected 
by popular vote, the National Assembly includes members elected by the House of Representatives, regional 
representatives elected by an electoral college oflocal authorities. e~nd members appointed by the king himself: 
(1) The National Assembly shall consi'st of sixty members as follows: -
(a) ten members to be nominated by His Majesty from amongst persons of high reputation 
who have rendered prominent service in various fields of national life. (Article 46) 
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Under the Panchayat system established by the 1962 constitution (Article 34 ), the king nominated 20% 
ofthe members of the National Panchayat; in the new system, he appoints 17% (10 out of60) ofthe members 
of one of the two houses. Nevertheless, popular objections to the absolutism of the old system did not focus 
so much on these direct appointees, but rather on the larger number chosen by local authorities who were 
themselves viewed as subject to royal manipulation. Under the old s)'stem, these constituted the other 80% 
of the national legislature. In the new system, they are fift een members, or 25%, of one house (Article 46/ lc), 
while a majority of 58% of that house, or 35 members out of 60, are chosen by the elected House of 
Representatives. Obviously, the potential for strong royal innuence on the legislature is present, but not for 
overriding the votes of elected representatives. Moreover, although both houses must vote on legislation and 
work out differences in joint commi !lees, the House of Representatives may override the rejection of a bill by 
the National Assembly, which includes the royal and loca l appointees, by a second majority vote, and pass it 
directly to the king without the agreement of the other house (Article 6917). 
The king must give assent to bills in order for them to become law, but he does not have veto power. He 
may send a bill back for further discussion; but if it is again passed, he must give his assent within thirty days 
(Article 71/3-4). Likewise, the king may promulga te ordinances on his own initiative when he thinks 
immediate action is necessary while the houses ofParliament are not in sess ion ; but Parliament may vote such 
ordinances out of existence as soon as they meet in session , and even without such a vote, theorclinances become 
void within six months (Article 72) . Thus, in overall balnnce the king 's legislative powers seem clearly 
delimited and subordinnted to democratic institutions. 
Although the king is not fonmlly defined as pnr1 ofthejudicimy, as he is with the e.xecutive and legislntive 
branches, he has the power to appoint judges; and, although he must do so with the advice ofvmious council s, 
their members include judges he has previously appointed, allowing for the poss ibility of a growth of 
cumulative influence over the yems ns other council members change with the succession of changing elected 
governments. He is supreme comnwnder of the military, whose co uris lie outside of the democra tic snfeguards 
imposed on appointments to and decisions of the civil courts. Moreover, he has sweeping powers to nullify 
tl1e decisions of an otherwise independent judicinry: 
His Majesty shall have the power to grant pardons and to suspend, commute or remit nny 
sentence passed by any couri, special court , military court or by any other judicial, quasi -
judicial or administrative nuthority or instituti on. (Ar1icle 122) 
The most obvious untouched remnant of absolute power left to the king is thnt of absolute legal immunity: 
"No question shall be raised in any court about any net performed by His Majesty" (Article 31). However, 
such immunity is hardly a unique privilege of the king; it also e.xtcnds to Ministers, Parlinment and various 
government offices and commissions in mntters such ns the government's fnilure to implement the 
"fundamental" constitutionally mandnted directive principles and policies (Article 24), recommendations or 
advice given by the Council of Ministers ''or nny other institution or official" (Article 35), nonobservance of 
rules governing the conduct of government business (Article 41), irregular proceedings in Parliament (Article 
62), allocation of election seats (Ariicle 105), nnd, perhnps most ominously, the suspension of fundamental 
rights during proclamations of emergency (Article 115). Thus, to the e.x tent that the constitution may contain 
potential weak spots and dangers for popular sovereignly and democracy, they may lie in immunity from 
recourse against abuses from forces in the government that are not confined to a possible future resurgence 
of absolutism in the monarchy itself. On the other hand, it is difficult to imagine how any government could 
function without some kinds of immunities to safeguard against harassment and malicious interference. Like 
the U.S. constitution's provisions for legislative immunities (Article L Section 6: " ... they shall not be 
questioned in any other place."), other democratic countries provide legal immunities either within the text 
of constitutional documents or elsewhere in.thewri tt en and unwrillen matri.x of constitutional principles and 
practices. In Nepal, as elsewhere, their pote n~ial for democratic or undemocratic implementation will be 
worked out within this larger matri.x. 
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The most sweeping powers allocated to the King me those relating to a proclamation of emergency : 
Emergency Power: (1) If a grave cri sis ari ses in regard to the sovereignty or integr ity of the 
Kingdom of Nepal or the security of ;my part thereof. whether by war. ex ternal aggression, 
armed rebellion or extreme eco nomic disarray, His Majesty may, by Proclamation, declare 
or order a State ofEmergen c~' ... (7 ) After the State of Emergency has been dec lared .. . His 
Majes ty may issue such Orders <IS are necessary .. .. Orders so issued shall be operative with 
the same fo rce and effect as law so long as the State of Emergency is in operCltion. (Article 
11 5) 
As was the case under the 1962 constitution (A 11i cle 8 1) , this article does not requi re the King to consult 
with Purliament, the Pr ime Min ister or any elected official before issuing such a proclamation. On the other 
hand, while the old constitution only stipulated that the King could subsequently consult parliamentary 
officials regarding terminCltion of a state of emergency " if he so des ires. " the 1990 constitution requi res an 
automatic review by Parliament within a specified time limit: 
(2) Every Proclamation or Order issued unde r clause ( 1) above shall be laid before a meeting 
of t he House ofReprcscntati ves fo r approval within three months from the dClte of issuance. 
(3) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approv<ll pursuant to clause (2) is Clpp rovecl by a two-
thirds majority of the House of Rcprcsc ntali\'es present at that meeting, such Proclamation 
or Order shall continue in force for a period of six months from the cla te of issua nee. (Article 
11 5) 
Thus, although the King's emc rgc n c~' powers arc virtually unlimited at the time of a proclamation of 
emergency, they are tempora ry and subjec t to over rul e by elected representatives in the long run. There is no 
provision for the extension of a sl<llC of emerge ncy beyond one year. ;II though he re. as in other situations, 
tamperi ng and Clbuse could be imagined. As with most such questions, the real significance of the Emergency 
Power article will only be seen in aclu<Ii pr; I c ti cc~ but it s potential effec ts on democracy and ri ghts me crucial. 
and it deserves cmef1Ii at te nti on (sec pa ge 15 lHHJ below) . 
In overClll ba lance, the constituti on;Ii mo narchy es tabli shed by the 1990 constitution may seem rather 
strongly inclined in the direction ofmonmchy. butnotuniqucly so. I fwc compare.[ or example, the constitution 
of Norway (No rway 181..!/1962). \\ C fi nd l'ii1ually the S<IIne guara ntee of legal immuni ty as in the Nepal 
constitution : 
The King 's person shall be sa c red~ he e<Jnnol be bl;Jmccl or accused. (Norway 181 4/196 2: 
A11icle 5) 
Moreover, the Norwegian constitution gives the King an <ipparcnt monopoly over power in the executive 
branch. seemingly in disregard of elec ted rcprcscnl<llives: 
. The King himself chooses a Council or Norwegian citi zens .. The Council shall consist of 
a Prime Mini ster and a I least seve n ol her members .... The King sha II <I pport ion the business 
Clmong the members of the Council of State. as he dee ms suitable. On ext raordinary 
occas ions, the King may summon other Norwcgi<ln ci ti ze ns to take a sca t in the Council of 
State, .. . but no member of the IParli a incn tlmay be summoned thu s. (No rway 18 14/196 2: 
Article 12) 
Nevertheless. as the ed ito r oil he Eng! ish eel it io n of l he Norwcgi;m co nstitution ( 18 14/196 2: 19) informs 
us, "Since 1884 the Ki ng has alw<I IS chose n Council s 11hich lw vc enjoyed the confidence of the Starting 
[Parliament]. It must be consiclcrccl <l firm co nsti luti onal customlh<ll a Government is bound to res ign if the 
Stort i ng makes clear tha l it clcsi res <I ch;1 ngc of gm'Cl' nmcnt. " The i nsta nee cleml y shows I hat in actual practi ce, 
unwritten practice may carry cqu;II or grc<ller COIISlitutional \I'C ight than wrillen provisions, and that 
"constitutions" extend f uri her than t hci r documcnta ry nl <lni fes l<1lions. an issue we shall return to below. With 
regard to the issue of constitutional monarch) . the Norwegian case sh011·s that a strong close of monarchism 
in a constitution 's written provi sions is notncccss<lrily a bar to popu lar sovereignty or the democratic control 
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of monarchial powers in the fu ll constitutional matri;.; of written and unwri llcn provisions and procedures, 
established principles and institutions and changing circumstances - for there arc few who would maintain 
that the royalist language wrilten into the Norwegian constitution has produced a correspond ingly undemo-
cratic state. The Nepal constitution, with less strong but still appreciable monarchist tendencies counterbal-
anced by stronger const itutionalist and democratic provi sions. is li kewise embedded in a larger constitutional 
matrix that wi ll shape the ultimate significance of its written provis ions in ways yet lobe revealed. 
Rights 
The 1990 constitution establishes new rights for the people of Nepal , and preserves others guaran teed 
under the 1962 constitution. The thirteen articles of Part 3 provide for the protection of certain "Funda menta l 
Rights": the rights to equality (Aiiicle 11), freedom ( 12), press and pub I ica tion ( 13), regarding cri minaljust ice 
(14), against preventive detention ( 15), to information (16) , property ( 17), cultural and educational right (18), 
to religion (19) , against exploitation (20), against exile (2 1), to privacy (22), and the right to constitutional 
remedy of abuses (23). Some of these articles include specifications of further rights. For exa mple, Article 
12, which begins by prohibiting unlawfc!l deprivation of personal liberty and capital punishment, goes on to 
guarantee five freedoms: (a) freedom of opinion and express ion: (b) freedom to assemble peaceably and 
without arms; (c) freedom to form unions and associations: (d) freedom to move throughout the Kingdom and 
reside in any part thereof; and (e) freedom to practi se any profess ion . or to carry on any occupation, industry, 
or trade. 
Other rights are mentioned elsewhere in the constitution. For exa mple, A11icle 26/6 says that "The State 
shall pursue a policy of increasing the participation of the labour force , the chief socio-economic force of the 
country ... ensuring the right to work, and thus protecting its rights and interests." Some rights are not explicitly 
designated as such, but are neve1iheless implied and established by prohibitions of their infringement. One 
of the most important of such rights, established in Part 17 and especially Article I 19. is that of citizens to form 
political parties and participate in elections. 
This right to form political parties, of course, is a cornerstone of the 1990 constitution. the slmggle fo r 
which was a primary cause of its coming into existence. The establishment of such a right in the 1990 
constitution required the elimination of the 1962 constitution 's Article I 1/2a. a prohibition on political parties, 
some\ovhat paradoxically inse11ed into the old constitution's bill of rights . This section of the old constitution, 
also labelled "Part 3," was called "Fundamental Duties and Rights, " and bega n with Article 9. "Fundamental 
Duties of the Citizen," which required "devotion to the Nation and loyalty to the State." along with exercising 
one's own rights with regard to law and the rights of others. as duties of every citizen. This miicle on duties 
was dropped, making Part 3 of the new constitution purely a bill of rights. 
Many of the rights g1.1aranteed in the 1990 constitution are carried over from the 1962 constitution. These 
include the rights to equality (old constitution Article I 0, new II) : freedom, including a further specification 
offivefreedoms as in the new constitution (old Article II. new 12); a right against exile (old 12, new 21) ; against 
exploitation (old 13 , new 20); to religion (old 14, new 19): properly (old 15 , new 17); and constitutional 
remedies (old 16, new 23 ). Fundamental rights not specified as such in the old constitution , but added to the 
new, include freedom of the press (new Article 13): the right against preventive detention (15): the right "to 
demand and receive information on any malter of public impo11ance" ( 16 ): the cultural and educational rights 
of "every community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal " (IS). and the right to privacy (22) 
Important changes have also been made in the provisions of some ofthearticlescarried over from the 1962 
constitution dealing with these f1tndamental rights. For example. a provision for affirmative action legislation 
to "protect or promote the interests of' the cjisadvantaged has been inserted into Article L 1, along with a 
prohibition of caste discrimination against untouchables and a guarantee of equal pay for the same work by 
men and women (11/3 -5). Article 12/1 ga ins a prohibition on capital puni shment , and Article 12/2e substitutes 
a guarantee of "freedom to choose any profession. occupation, trade or to start any industry" for the old 
constitution's freedom to acquire, enjoy or dispose of property (old article ll/2e), a right guaranteed elsewhere 
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in both documents. Article 14 establishes as a separate right the freedom from police and judicial abuses 
formerly included as subsections of the right to freedom (old Article 11/3-8); and it adds a new prohibition on 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Clause 4). Article 19, Clause (2) adds guarantees 
of rights of religious communities to those previously granted to individuals; and Article 20/4 protects children 
against hazardous employment. All in all , the 1990 constitution provides for substantial ga ins in human rights 
over and above those guaranteed in the 1962 constitution. 
However, the establishment of new rights and strengthening of old ones does not represent an unqualified 
gain. In the majority of cases, the provision for a right is followed by some kind of restrictions or limitations 
on that right, some more extensive than others. For example, Article 20, the Right against Exploitation, states: 
(1) Traffic in human beings, slavery, serfdom or forced labour in any form is prohibited. Any 
contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law; ... (2) No minor shall be employed 
in work in any factory or mine, or be engaged in any other hazardous work. (Article 20) 
This statement of the right is followed by a simple qualification: 
Provided that nothing herein shall be a bar to providing by law for compulsory service for 
public purposes. (Ibid.) 
On the other hand, the complexly formulated "Right to Freedom" (Article 12), with its embedded list of 
freedoms (see above) , contains a list of qualifications considerably longer than the list offreedoms they qualify: 
Provided that - (l) nothing in sub-clause (a) [the freedom of opinion and expression] shall 
be deemed to prevent the making oflaws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which 
may undermine the sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal , or which may 
jeopardize the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes 
or communities, or on any act of sedition, defamation, contempt of court or incitement to 
an offence; or on any act which may be contrary to decent public behaviour or morality; 
(2) nothing in sub-clause (b) [the freedom to assemble] shall be deemed to prevent the 
making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the 
sovereignty, integrity or law and order situation oft he Kingdom ofNepal ; (3) nothing in sub-
clause (c) [the freedom to form unions and associations] shall be deemed to prevent the 
making of laws to impose reasonable restrictions on any act which may undermine the 
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal, which may jeopardize the harmonious 
relations subsisting among the peoples of various castes, tribes or communities, which may 
instigate violence, or which may be contrary to public morality; (4) nothing in sub-clause 
(d) [the freedom to move] shall be deemed to prevent the making of laws which are in the 
interest of the general public, or which arc made to impose reasonable restrictions on any 
act which may jeopardize the harmonious relations subsisting among the peoples of various 
castes, tribes or communities; (5) nothing in sub-clause (e) [the freedom to practice any 
profession, occupation. industry. or trade] shall be deemed to prevent the making oflaws to 
impose restriction on any act which may be contrary to public health or morality, to confer 
on the State the exclusive right to undertake specified industries, businesses or services; or 
to impose any condition or qualification for carrying on any industi)', trade, profession or 
occupation. (Article 12) 
These detailed restrictions on specific rights are a new feature in the 1990 constitution, replacing a long 
list of qualifications and restrictions applicable to rights in general inse11ed at the end of Part 3 of the old 
constitution (Nepal 1962/1976: Article 17). Despite the use of language broad enough to create a certain 
potential for abuse, in most cases these q;1alifications and limitations on rights seem reasonable safeguards 
against potential dangers to individuals. communities or the people at large, or necessities for maintaining a 
functioning government; and most such restrictions. in fact , are common practice in democratic societies. 
Nevertheless, there are ~onsiderable contrasts between countries in the constitutional formulation of the 
balance between rights and restrictions. In the U.S. constitution, for example, rights are generally stated in 
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absolute form, without qualifications. with limitations established outside the wrillcn constitution by enacted 
laws, case law and precedents, and customary practi ce. lt might legitimately be asked whet her such an abso lu te, 
unqualified statement of rights may create expectations ilnd encourage practices which strcngthenthose rights 
and place the burden on those who would limi t them~ or whether. on the other hand. the automatic inclusion 
of qualifications and limitations in sta tements of rights mi ght weaken them and encourage their suppression. 
Theevidencefromcompara tivecases is inco nclusive. but sugges ts otherwise. T he U.S. constitu tion, whi le 
tending towards unqualified statements of right s. nevertheless specifies some restr ictions, including a 
provision for suspending habeas corpus'' ... when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety nwy require 
it" (Article 1, Section 9);4 and several amendments in the Bill of Rights (Amendments 1-10) specify similar 
exceptions or include "except as prescribed by lmv" clauses. The co nstitution of Ca nilda tilkes the somewhat 
different approach, resembling that of the 1962 Nepil l constitution. of listing specific rights without 
qualifications in its "Canadian Charter of Rights and Customs" (Canada 1982/ 1983: Part I) , but frames this 
list between an opening statement that such rights are subject " to such reilsonabl e limits prescribed by law as 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democra ti c society" (Section 1) , and a concluding provision that 
the national Parliament or a provincial legislature may enact laws which "shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision included in" the Charter of Rights it se lf(Section 33 ). Despite the seemingly crippling lan i:,'1Jage of 
Section 33 , it seems unlikely that Ca nildians are any less secure in their const itutional rights than citizens of 
the US., with its more abso lute language . On the other hand. the constitution oft he People's Repub lic of China 
(China 1982/1987: Chapter 2. Articles 33-56) includes some unqualified statements of rights in absolute terms 
reminiscent of the US. Constitution : 
Citizens ofthePeople 's Repub lic of China enjoy freedom of speech. of the press, of assembl y, 
of association, of procession and of demonstration (Article 35~ cf. U.S. constitution 1789/ 
1979, Amendment 1) 
But in actual practice, the implementation and exercise of such rights is not ilbsolute in either country, 
and in fact differs to almost the greatest ex tent imaginab le in the two cou nt ries. It would seem that the presence 
or absence of qualifications in constit ut ional statement s of rights is at best il secondary factor which, if it has 
significant impact on practice, operates in the contex t of much more important factors in the la rger 
constitutional matrix ofwrillen and unwritten principles and practices. Thus. although unqualified statements 
of rights may produce a more positive impress ion of their strength and importance in a particul ar society, while 
frequent qualifications and limits as in the new Nepal constitution may evoke the impression of a di strust or 
uneasiness about rights, nevertheless the highly qualilicd rights of the Nepal constitution may, in the process 
of implementation and interpretation over the course of time, prove as strong and important, or even more so, 
than those stated in more absolute terms elsewhere. 
One factor which may prove crucial in thi s process. because of the dange r it seems to present , is the issue 
of suspension of rights during a state of emergency (see al so page 9 000 above). Article 11 5 allows for broad 
suspensions of rights in such emergencies: 
If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the Ki ngclom of Nepal or 
the security of any part thereof, whether by war. ex ternal aggression . armed rebellion or 
extreme economic disarray, His Majesty may, by Proclamation. declare or order a State of 
Emergency .... (8) His Majest)' may, at the time of making a Proclamation or Order of a State 
of Emergency pursuant to clause ( 1), suspend sub-clauses (a) , (b) , (d) and (e) of clause (2) 
of Article 12, clause (1) of Article 13 and Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23 of this Constitution 
for as long as the Proclamation is in operation: Provided that the right to the remedy of 
habeas corpus under Article 23 shall not be suspended. (Article 11 5) 
In the 1962 constitution 's emergency powers provisions (At1icle 81 ), the King could suspend "all or any" 
articles of the constitution. In the 1990 constitution. the rights subject to suspension under emergency 
proclamations are limited in number~ they include: Article 12, the right to freedom 's Clause 2a, freedom of 
opinion and eli.'}Jression; 2b, freedom to assemble peaceably and without arm s~ 2d, freedom to move throughout 
the Kingdom and reside an)'\\;here; and 2e, freedom to practice any profession, occupation, industry. or trade; 
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as well as the press and publication right, guaranteeing freedom from censorship (Article 13); the right against 
preventive detention (15) ; the right to information (16); the right to property (17); the right to privacy (22); 
and the right to constitutional remedy against official oppression and abuses (23). Individuals do, however, 
have recourse within three monthsoftermination of a proclamation of emergency to seek compensation in court 
for "any damage ... inflicted upon any person by an act of any official which was done in contravention of law 
or in bad faith" during the emergency. Except under these narrowly-defined circumstances, there is no legal 
remedy for deprivation of rights : 
(9) In circumstances where His Majesty has suspended any Article of this Constitution .. . , 
no petition may lie, nor question be raised in any co uti for the enforcement of the fundamental 
right conferred by such Article. (Article 115) 
If the cumulative weight of restrictions and potential revocability of rights suggests a certain air of 
authoritarianism, and the impression that the constitution's "fundamental" rights are somewhat more 
insubstantial and precarious than might be hoped for, it is no accident that much of this impression comes from 
the Emergency Power article. Such provisions for emergencies are both part of the necessary crisis-handling 
mechanisms of democracies, and, as worldwide experience has shown, pat1 of the most effective political 
weaponry of aspiring autocrats and tyrants. It is obvious that the occasional use of emergency powers elsewhere 
to topple democracies does not make them any more a candidate for elimination than other institutions that 
have brought down democracies, such as <nmies or elections. Nevertheless, because emergency powers are 
by nature authoritarian and rights-restricting, their use in democracies would seem to call for special safeguards 
against misuse. In the lengths to which the Nepal constitution has gone to protect the government against 
disruptions by its own citizens, both in emergencies and in the restriction of rights under everyday non-crisis 
conditions, it is difftcult to imagine what place those rights now occupy on the continuum between political/ 
legal efficacy and quasi-mythical ideological symbolism. This issue remains one of the more perplexing and 
crucial questions in the transition to the new constitution. 
Ethnicity, Caste, Language, Religion 
One of the most pervasive problems of modern world politics has been the difftculty of reconciling 19th-
century European ideals of the ethnic and cultural homogeneity in the "nation-state" with 20th-century 
realities of multiethnic and multicultural polities.\ In the decades following the mid-20th-centuty wave of 
decolonization, many writers assumed this problem to be patiicularly characteristic of the newly independent 
nations of the Third World, stemming from the "artificial" creation of boundaries by colonial powers. 
Experience in recent decades suggests thai both ethnic and cultural diversity and their associated problems are 
important political factors in both industrialized and Third World countries, neither simply nor characteris-
tically associated with previously colonized stales, because homogeneity is rarely if ever found at levels beyond 
the smallest locality, and hence "nations" and states are never contiguous. 
Thus, the problem for all modern states becomes one of creating and maintaining a sense of"national" 
unity in a polity that is inherently transnational, that is, mulliethnic and multicultural. Nepal has confronted 
this problem explicitly since the formation of a mulliethnic stale by Prithivi Narayan Shah in the 1760s, and 
implicitly during the growth of the culturally diverse Kathmandu Valley civilization in the preceding centuries 
(cf. HOfer 1979 for a detailed historical analysis of earlier legal codes, and the issues involved). In the latest 
attempt at formulating a definition of national identity, Article 2 of the 1990 constitution defines "the nation" 
as: 
Having commonaspirationsandunited by a bond of allegiance to national independence and 
integrity of Nepal , the Nepalese people irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe, 
collectively constitute the nation. (Atiicle 2) 
The wording of the same article in the 1962 constiluli'on was similar, except that it had the people "united 
by the common bond of allegiance to the Crown" (Nepal 1962: Article 2). The change is obviously part of 
the process of constitulionalizing the monarchy and transferring sovereignty to the people. Article 4 goes on 
to define the nature of the kingdom - i.e. , the stale: 
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Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, in~ivisible , sovereign , Hindu 
and Constitutional Monarchical Kingdom. (Article 4) 
Here, besides the insertion of "Constitutional" , we have three new terms not included in the 1962 
constitution's definition of the state: "multiethnic'-' , "multilingual", and "democratic". The incorporation 
of diversity into the basic definition of the stale reflects, on a larger scale, the worldwide 1990s trend away from 
melting-pot ideologies in response to unsatisfactory experiments with assimilationist and hegemonist 
treatment of minorities and attempts to suppress or eliminate diversity. More directly, it reflects Nepal's own 
experience with past attempts to impose a "national" identity based on the cultural and linguistic heritage of 
only a few of the many cultural-linguistic minorities who together constitute the population of the country. 
Issues arising from sometimes draconian implementations of such policies against otherethnic-cultural groups 
played a major role in the accumulation of tensions that led to the pro-democracy outbreaks of 1990; indeed, 
they were one of the problems for which democracy was demanded as a solution. Thus, along with democracy 
and constitutionalism themselves, issues of diversity relating to ethnic, caste. linguistic, religious and other 
"communities" are crucial factors in the new constitution. 
The 1990 constitution's term Bahujatlya, translated as ''multiethnic" in the official translation, is itself 
embedded in the complexities of Nepal 's diverse mosaic of ethn ic, caste and other communities. A11icle 11 
presents us with this set of glosses for terms relating to such commun ities: 
(1) All citizens shall be equal before law. No person sha ll be denied equal protection of the 
laws. (2) No discrimination shall be made against any citizen in the application of general 
laws on grounds of religion (dharma), race (varr:w). sex (linga), caste Uat) , tribe Uati) or 
ideological conviction (vaicarik) or any of them. (3) The Stale shall not discriminate among 
citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste. tribe, or ideological conviction or any of 
these. (Article 11/2) 
In evetyday parlance, jat can be used to refer to either caste or ethnic groups. This usage, more than the 
technical definitions of Article 11 , reflects the complex interplay of identities and ideologies resulting from 
the historical imposition of caste concepts and practices upon an ethnically diverse polity. As various scholars 
have pointed out, ethnic groups lack the traditional occupational specializations and class-specific morality 
contrasts of true castes, and, hence, lack the hierarchy-generat ing distinctions of habitual pure or impure 
conduct, that lie at the basis ofthe Hindu caste system: they have no inherent place in the system, as they are 
foreign to it. And yet, if the polity is to be ideologically, socially and politically "Hindu." they must somehow 
be included in the system. Moreover, since the historical basis of the "Hindu" polity includes the conquest 
and subjugation of some Hindus, as well as non-Hindus, by Hindus of other ethn ic groups, the constmction 
of a countrywide rationalized caste system has also required the reshuffling of preexisting caste identities and 
hierarchies to assure caste dominance by members of that caste with the proper ethnic and cultural ties to the 
dominant ethnic group. Hence, the various allempts over the centuries to assimilate non-Hindu ethnic groups 
to the system by reiiication ofcustommy behaviors (drinking alcohol , eating beef), and the resulting confusions 
and contradictions, such as the treatment ofNewars sometimes considered as a single subordinate caste, and 
sometimes with recognition of the complex stratification of the Newars' own traditional caste hierarchies (cf. 
HOfer 1979, especially Chapters 2-4, 7, and II). Given such complexity and internal contradictions, the 
collapseofthesystem maybe unsurprising; but new constitutional initiatives built on the base of such a complex 
heritage, combined with an impetus to democracy (cf. Article 11 's reference to "ideological conviction") and 
egalitarianism, raise an even more complex set of issues that can only be touched on here. 
The tension between caste ideology .and practices of dominance/subordination, on the one hand, and 
democracy, egalitarianism and the protection of rights such as equal treatment and non-discrimination, on the 
other, finds expression in affirmative actioi1 provisions, some shared with the 1962 constitution and the Indian 
constitution, and others new: 
12 
Provided that special provisions may be made by law for the protection and advancement 
of the interests ·of women, children, the aged or those who are physically or mentally 
incapacitated or those whobelong to a class which is economically, socially or educationally 
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backward. (4) No person shalL on the basis of caste, be discriminated against as 
untouchable, be denied access to any public place, or be deprived of the use of public utilities. 
Any contravention of this provision shall be punishable by law. (5) No discrimination in 
regard to remuneration shall be made between men and wohlen for the same work. (Article 
11) 
In contrast to such provisions, with their emphasis on the rights of individuals belonging to groups that 
have suffered negative impacts of past practices. Article 18 introduces new provisions regarding the rights of 
"communities" as a whole, expressed in positive terms: 
(1) Each community residing within the Kingdom of Nepal shall have the right to preserve 
and promote its language. script and culture. (2) Each community shall have the right to 
operate schools up to the primary level in its own mother tongue for impa11ing education to 
its children. (Article 18) 
Such provisions serve as an antidote to the oppressive policies of the past and a safeguard against their 
future resurgence, and provide a specific basis for the ''multiethnic, multilingual" definition of the kingdom 
in Article 4. The wri\len provisions in themselves would seem to do little towards the realization of a 
linguistically and ethnically diverse state. insofar as they refer specifically to private groups and institutions. 
However, reports of the return of long-suppressed languages to stale school curricula and media broadcasts 
would suggest that, at least in regard to linguistic diversity issues. the unwrillen range of constitutional 
principles and practices are developing in accord with the pluralist intent expressed in these provisions oft he 
written constitution. Whether an adequate basis has been established for maintaining the balance between, 
on the one hand, the danger of regression into oppressiveness and. on the other hand, the risk of mutation of 
diversity into divisiveness and coitllict. is as unsettled a question with Nepal as it is with other countries faced 
with the late 20th century resurgence of ethnic nationalism. 
Another obviously unsellled issue is that of religious diversity. Articles 2 and 11, among others, make 
reference to equal treatment of religions and the right to practice one's own religion. a right spelled out in more 
detail in Article 19 : 
(1) Every person shall have the freedom to profess and practise his own religion as handed 
down to him from ancient times having due regard to traditional practices: provided that no 
person shall be entitled to convert another person from one religion to another. (2) Every 
religious denomination shall have the right to maintain its independent existence and for 
this purpose to manage and protect its religious places and trusts. (Article 19) 
Yet there is at least an inherent logical contradiction between such provisions as A11icle 2 's definition of 
the nation as constituted by "the Nepalese people irrespective of religion ... " and Article 4's definition of the 
state as a "Hindu kingdom", irrespective of the religious diversity of the Nepalese people. Does this 
contradiction in the identities of the nation and the state undermine either the integrity of the state itself, or 
the religious freedom of its people'! The answer is not entirely clear. While "separation of church and state" 
as in the U.S. constitution provides a strong supp01i for religious freedom. it is by no means the only available 
choice for democratic countries. England. for example. has its Established Church headed by the King or 
Queen, as does Nonvay. The Constitution of Sri Lanka ( 1978). while guaranteeing freedom of religion 
(A11icles 10, 14), neve11heless gi,·es Buddhism "the foremost place" and requires the slate "to protect and 
foster" it (Article 9). Church-stale relations and the conflicts that may arise out of them take many forms and 
degrees of severity, and no simple relationship seems to e.\:isl between the taller and written constitutional 
provisions. Thus, the seemingly lwnds-offlanguage of the U.S. constitution has not prevented problems such 
as widespread suppression of America nlnclia n religious practices. or conll icts over al\empls to restrict Santeria 
and other religions from practicing ritual sacrifice- an a \lack on religious freedom to which some traditional 
Nepal Hindus would likewise be vulnerable were the~· to attempt to practice their religion in the U.S . And some 
constitutionally-defined "secular" states such as India have not been strangers either to religious conflict or 
to accusations of state complicity and partiality. 
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Nevertheless, theestab li slm1ent of a religion also estab li shes ani nevi table formal inequality which implies 
some risk of discrimination, of whatever degree of mi Iciness or severi ty : and which undercuts national unity , 
necessarily based on perceptions of common heritage and aspirations, to the extent that those outside the 
established religion feel themselves excl uded from or ·peripheral to a defi ning characterist ic of national 
identity. Could such problems beaver1 ed by including a prm·ision simil ar to thi s one in the Indian constitution? 
Explanation II. - ... the reference to Hindus shall be construed as includi ng a reference to 
persons professing the Sikh, Jaina or Buddhist rei igion, and the reference to Hindu religious 
institutions shall be constnred accordingly. (India 1950/1983: Article 25) 
A similar provision for Nepal might read: 
Reference to Hindus shall be construed as including a reference to persons professing the 
Buddhist, Shamanist or other religions existing in Nepal over the course of many centuries, 
and references to Hindu religion and religious institutions shall be construed accordingly. 
Such a provision might have the effect of extending protection to Nepal's other widely-followed 
indigenous South Asian religions. On the other hand, it might also eas ily evoke feel ings of being subsumed 
in a kind ofHinducentric hegemony, despite the long history of Hinduism, Buddhism, and shamanism alike 
as inclusive rather that exclusive religions, able to coexist well with other religions. And of course it would 
not solve the problem of a religion such as Islam, also present in Nepal for many centuries, or of more recent 
introductions such as Christianity. 
The latter religion, along with Theravada Buddhism and perhaps other traditions as well , have felt the 
effect of anti-missionary provisions included in previous codes and expressed in this constitution as a 
prohibition on Dharma parivartana ga rauna, causing another person's religion to be changed or conver1ed 
to one's own. This prohibition was added after the draft constitution, in conformity with earlier anti-
proselytizing and anti-missionary laws. In the past. such prohibitions were so metimes interpreted broadly 
enough to justify action against those who changed their own religious affiliations to another religion . Such 
actions were brought to bear not only on Nepalese citizens from various religious traditions who conver1ed to 
Christianity, but also in some cases against those who converted from at least nominally "Hindu" backgrounds 
to Buddhism. Retention of the prohibition thus raises the quest ion of whether a relic of the anti-democratic 
past has been enshrined in the constitution, or whether, on the other hand, the equality of religions could ever 
be implemented with enough fairness to allow for it s application to expansionist and mi ssionary-oriented 
Hindu religious movements. 
In the case of religions and other areas, it might be useful to think of rights and freedoms as definable in 
two modes: parametric and quantum. Parametric interpretations of rights are based on parameters assumed 
universally and equally applicable: e.g., all reli gions are afforded equal protection and freedom. Quantum 
interpretations of rights take cognizance or the embodiment or rights and their definition s in specific human 
instances, where ideals of universal equality are conditioned by the rea l differences and inequalities of 
historical , political and econom ic conditions: e.g .. that the institutional bases of so me religions might enjoy 
vastly greater political and economic power than others. and that an apparently equal contest for the loya lties 
of given individuals and communities might be no contest at all when that power ca n be brought to bear. What 
from the standpoint of one religion might appear anunfair restriction or unequal treatment might well appear 
from others' viewpoints to be an allempt to ensure that the barefoot runner does not have to race the man in 
the Cadillac. In such cases, as with other forms of affirmative action , fair trea tment might require a measure 
of inequality, if it could be judiciously applied to even out an unfair advantage held by one side. But if such 
measures were taken in Nepal, for exa mpl e, to help loca l Hinduism co mpete with international missionary 
religions, could or should they also be used to help religions such as Buddhism or shamanism compete with 
whatever unequal advantages might be enjoyed by the established religion of the ''Hindu kingdom"? 
Perhaps it is only realistic in the late twentieth century to recogni ze that so me religions receive massive 
financing and support from international sources, public as well as private, and that traditions with loca l bases 
in poorer countries may require protection and support in order to compete success fully with transnational 
religious conglomerates, or even to survive their onslaught. On the other hand , religious conver1s do not 
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thereby renounce their Nepalese identity , and their inclusion in ''the nation" seems as desirable as with any 
other community if the state and nation are to be truly diverse. non-di scriminatory, and grounded in the identity 
of the Nepalese people. 
Conclusion 
Written constitutions such as the Nepal constitution of 1990, the U.S . constitution, and similar documents 
are only a partofthefundamental principles of governance of their respective polities. The term "constitution" 
in the usage of political science and political anthropology covers a ground that extends beyond these written 
documents, defining the fundamental law of a sociopolitical entity even in the complete absence of written 
constitutional documents . The classic case for political science is the British constitution, a complex of 
traditions extending from Magna Carta through centuries of parliamentary acts, unwritten common-law 
traditions, case-law decisions and legal precedents which together constitute a f11ndamentallaw as binding as 
any written constitutional document, although a unified document called a "constitution" is entirely absent. 
In anthropological usage, the "constitution" of ethnopolitical entities such as the Ashanti (Rattray 1929), 
Yoruba (Lloyd 1954) or Cheyenne (Hocbel 1954) is almost invariably unwritten , although the principles of 
fundamental law contained in its oral traditions and practices may be perhaps more binding and less open to 
djspute and ambiguity of interpretation than the wril!cn constitutions of larger nation-states. In the broadest 
anthropological sense, the constitution of a given group or polity is coextensive with its culture. or at least with 
those parts of culture taken as normative by its members. 
If a written constitution exists for a gi\·cn polity, it is simply the documentary tip of a much more extensive 
constitutional iceberg, which may depict the actual constitution in various ranges from relatively accurate to 
highly misleading. The Bill of Rights of the U.S. constitution, for example, depicts rights in absolute terms 
("Congress shall make no law regarding .. . " ) \\'hich in actual prnctice (that is, in the actual U.S. constitution 
as opposed to its documentary codification) become qualified and limited by precedent, case lnw, and 
ideological cultural consensus: "Freedom of speech does not guarantee the right to shout ' Fire! ' in a crowded 
theatre. " The guarantees of freedom of religion in the Soviet and the Chinese (PRC) constitutions have not 
always led to rights as unambiguous and unrestricted in practice as the straightforward language of the 
respective documents would seem to imply : nor has the closing qualifier to the Bill of Rights in the Canadian 
constitution, which seems to give the govcmmcnt po\\'cr to take away a lithe rights guaranteed in the preceding 
clauses, in practice led to a wholesale suppression of rights. Constitutions and their language may be highly 
important in symbolic terms, but the meanings of the symbols they invoke must be determined with respect 
to a wider range of constitutional practices and traditions than the written documents themselves are capable 
of embodying. 
It is the growth and clcvclopmcnt of this \\'icier matrix ofwril!cn and unwritten principles and practices 
that will determine, as it docs in every case. the significance ofNcpal 's 1990 constitution and the issues it raises. 
An introductory survey such as this one. based on the constitutional document itself embedded in historical 
and comparative contexts, but \\'ithout sufficient clcvclopmcnt of implementation and interpretation to reveal 
the larger patterns and trends of the matri.'\. can only represent a highly simplified preliminary sketch of the 
issues involve. For the moment, such a sketch may be useful in identifying basic issues and potential paths 
of development: but the real meaning and interest ofthc 1990 constitution will only be shown by the shape 
that it takes in the hands of the nC\\ ly clcctccl representatives. political leaders, and ultimately the people of 
NepaL 
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NOTES 
In the late 1980s, the Government submitted a re, ·ised list of import duties and tariffs for approval 
by the National Panehayal. The discovery that the li st of duties on imported foods included the word "beef' 
created such a furor of denouncements of the Go\'crnment thnt a new li st, minus the offending term , was hasti ly 
submitted in its place. 
The engle was adopted ns the U.S. symbol in I 7H2 , after the adoption oft he country ' s first constitution, 
the Articles of Confederation of 1781 ; but it s status as national symbol \\'aS not referred to in the 1789 
constitution. Legal protection begnn in 1940, and was further strengthened by the Endangered Species Act 
ofl973. 
Regarding symbols and continuities. those interested in Nepal 's heritage of Hindu and Buddhist 
Tantrism may note that the new constitution includes provisions on the "Method of Making the Sun" and the 
"Method of Making the Moon" (Schedule 1 ). 
Compare Article 115/8 of the Nepal constitution. which e.\pl icitly forbids such a suspension of habeas 
corpus even under a proclamation of emergency. 
In traditional European usngc. "nations." related to notus. "birth." referred to peoples sharing a 
common heritage, and was used much like the modern "ethni c groups." whether or not groups so designated 
exercised absolute sovereignty over their territory. During the 18th and particularly the 19th century, the ideal 
that nationsshou/dbe states and vice versa - that is . that peoples should be i ndependcnt and sovereign -became 
widespread, and played a role in various revolutions and i ndependcnce mo\·ements. The strength oft he nation-
state ideal gradually led to popular usnge that assumes the identity of the two terms. and perhaps creates the 
expectation, retrospectively, that all states are ipso fnctu nations. 
16 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XI (1-3) 1991 
References Cited 
Ellingson, Ter 
1990 "Tibetan Monastic Constitutions." In Reflections on Tibetan Culture: Essays in Memory of 
Turrell V Wylie. Lawrence Epstein and Richard Sherburne, eds., Lewiston: Edwin Mellen 
Press. 
Errington, Shelly 
1989 Meaning and Power in a Southeast Asian Realm. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Hoebel, E. Adamson 
1954 The Law of Primitive Man. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hofer, Andras 
1979 The Caste Hierarchy and the State in Nepal: A Study of the Muluki A in of 1854. Innsbruck: 
UniversiUitsverlag Wagner. 
India Constitution 
1950 The Constitution of India (As Modified up to the 15th August, 1983). Government of India, 
Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, 1983 . 
Lloyd, Peter C. 
1954 "The Traditional Political System of the Yoruba," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 10: 
366-384. 
Nepal Constitution 
1962 The Constitution of Nepal (As Amended by the first and second amendments of the Constitution). 
Kathmandu: His Majesty's Government of Nepal Ministry of Law and Justice, Law Books 
Management Committee, 1976. 
1990 The Constitution ofthe Kingdo111 ofNepal 20./7 (1990). Kathmandu: His Majesty's Government 
Ministry of Law, Justice & Parliamentary Affairs, Law Books Management Board, 1992. 
Norway Constitution 
1814 The Constitution of Norway. Edited by Tonnes Andeanres, Oslo: Norwegian Universities Press, 
1962. 
People's Republic of China Constitution 
1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress and Prolllulgatedfor f111ple111entation by the Proc/a/1/alion of the 
National People's Congress on Dece111ber 4, J 982). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987. 
People's Republic of China Constitution 
1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of China (Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Fifth Na-
tional People's Congress and Pro111ulgated forllllplelllentation by the Proc/a/1/ation of the 
National People's Congress on Dece111ber .f. J 982). Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1987. 
Rattray, R. S. 
1929 Ashanti Law and Constitution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Sri Lanka Constitution 
1978 The Constitution of the De111ocratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (Certified on 31st August, 
1978). Colombo: Government Publications Bureau, Department of Government Printing, Sri 
Lanka. 
United States Constitution 
1789 The Declaration of independence and the Constitution of the United Stales of America. Wash-
ington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979. 
NEPAL CONSTITUTION: PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 17 
18 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XI ( 1-3) 1991 
